Balancing formality and informality in business exchanges as a duality: a comparative case study of returnee and local entrepreneurs in China by Daomi Lin (7198499) et al.
 1 
 
 
Balancing Formality and Informality in Business Exchanges as a Duality: A 
Comparative Case Study of Returnee and Local Entrepreneurs in China 
 
 
Daomi Lin (林道谧) 
Sun Yat-sen University 
China  
 
Jiangyong Lu (路江涌) 
Peking University 
China  
 
Peter Ping Li (李平) 
Copenhagen Business School 
Denmark 
 
Xiaohui Liu (刘晓辉) 
Loughborough University 
UK 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Balancing Formality and Informality in Business Exchanges as a Duality: A 
Comparative Case Study of Returnee and Local Entrepreneurs in China 
 
Abstract 
The management paradigms in the West mainly rely on legal contracts and explicit rules 
(formality), while the management traditions in the East emphasize social relationships and 
implicit norms (informality). In an era of ‘West-meets-East’, balancing formality and 
informality is becoming critical for firms, especially those facing institutional differences in 
transnational contexts and institutional transitions. In this study, we conducted a comparative 
multi-case study on returnee entrepreneurs and local entrepreneurs in China. We found that at 
the early stage of venturing returnee entrepreneurs emphasized formality more than 
informality, while local entrepreneurs stressed informality more than formality. However, the 
formality-informality balance among both returnee and local entrepreneurs converged over 
time in line with the institutional transition in China. Returnee entrepreneurs increased the 
emphasis on informality (but kept the dominant position of formality), whereas local 
entrepreneurs gradually shifted from informality to formality. The spatial pattern of 
asymmetrical balancing and the temporal pattern of transitional balancing are both rooted in 
the Chinese philosophy of Yin-Yang balancing. 
Keywords: formality-informality balance, institutional differences and institutional dynamics, 
returnee and local entrepreneurship, Yin-Yang duality 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of emerging economies in the East and the increasing global integration of 
diverse economies have reshaped the business reality from the traditional context of 
‘West-leads-East’ to a new one of ‘West-meets-East’ (Chen & Miller, 2010). One important 
characteristic of the ‘West-meets-East’ era is that different institutions in the West and East 
interact more intensively than in the era of ‘West-leads-East’ through the global expansion of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the more frequent human mobility across national 
borders. The past decade has witnessed an upsurge of new ventures initiated by entrepreneurs 
such as transnational entrepreneurs, ethnic entrepreneurs and returnee entrepreneurs who are 
exposed to a transnational context (Droi, Honig, & Wright, 2009). Among them, returnee 
entrepreneurs, who typically have spent a considerable period of time in developed economies 
and then returned to their home countries, have become an important phenomenon in Eastern 
countries such as China, India, and Korea.  
There are distinctions between returnee and local entrepreneurs. For example, returnee 
entrepreneurs tend to enjoy the advantage of being familiar with formality (e.g., technological 
capabilities) but suffer from the disadvantage of being weak in informal elements (e.g., local 
connections) (Li, Zhang, Li, Zhou, & Zhang, 2012). It is also observed that returnee 
entrepreneurs prefer explicit rules, while local entrepreneurs are in favor of implicit norms. 
However, all entrepreneurs must combine both formal and informal elements to survive and 
grow, so the real question is how to balance the two seemingly conflicting elements (Cardinal, 
Sitkin, & Long, 2004). In particular, we are interested in how returnee and local entrepreneurs 
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differ when they balance formality and informality in their business exchanges given their 
distinctive preferences for formal or informal elements.  
The notion of formality and informality is central to economic and social exchanges as two 
fundamental dimensions of the governance mode for both inter-firm and intra-firm transactions 
(Li, 2007) in such contexts as organization control (Cardinal et al., 2004), organization 
hierarchy (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011), social relations (Morand, 1995), and inter-firm 
collaborations (Zhang, Wan, Jia, & Gu. 2009). The preference for formality refers to an 
emphasis on elements associated with impersonal exchange (e.g., legal contracts and explicit 
rules) over elements related to personal relationships (e.g., social relationships and implicit 
norms). The preference for informality is primarily shaped by the institutional context which 
comprises of both formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). 
 Prior literature has recognized the effect of the local institutional environment on 
entrepreneurs’ cognition and behavior (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010). However, most studies 
have focused on a single country’s institutions without taking account of the increasing human 
mobility crossing national borders, limiting our understanding of institutions and 
entrepreneurship in transnational contexts. More specifically, we know little about how 
entrepreneurs’ prior exposure to an institutional environment affects their management 
orientations in business exchanges when they start new ventures in a new institutional 
environment. Furthermore, organizational behavior co-evolves with the institutional 
transitions (e.g., Dieleman & Sachs, 2006). This begs the question of whether firms with 
different initial managerial preferences for formality or informality in business transactions 
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would converge or diverge over time as an economy evolves, especially in the context of 
dramatic institutional transition. Hence, our research focuses on two questions: (1) How do 
local and returnee entrepreneurs who have different prior exposures to the Western or Eastern 
institutional context balance formality and informality in their business exchanges when they 
start new ventures in their home country (i.e., China)? (2) How do local and returnee 
entrepreneurs shift their specific balances between formality and informality in their business 
exchanges over time? 
Due to the paucity of theories on entrepreneurship in transnational contexts and dynamic 
institutional settings, we adopt the comparative multi-case study method (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Using both qualitative and quantitative data, we compare how two groups of entrepreneurial 
firms (i.e., returnee and local firms) balance formality and informality in China at both the early 
and later stages of venturing.  
The study seeks to make three contributions. First, we contribute to the transnational 
entrepreneurship literature by showing that entrepreneurs with prior exposure to different 
institutional contexts have different balances of formality and informality at the early stage of 
venturing. Over time, these firms in the same institutional context will converge to a similar 
formality-informality balance in business exchanges. Second, we contribute to the on-going 
debate of the formality-informality dichotomy as complementary or substitutive. Our study 
highlights that formal and informal elements are simultaneously complementary and 
substitutive, and the specific balances of the two elements are asymmetrical in a spatial pattern. 
Third, our study found that over time entrepreneurs increasingly emphasize synergy rather than 
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tradeoff, resulting in a more moderate formality-informality balance, which is called 
transitional in a temporal pattern. The last two contributions evoke the Chinese philosophy of 
Yin-Yang balancing, explaining the flexibility in balancing formal and informal approaches 
with global implications for non-Chinese entrepreneurs.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Formality refers to the nature of business exchanges as explicitly prescribed, exogenously 
imposed, and rigidly enforced by vertical authority powers in a universalistic and 
depersonalized process (e.g., objective, rational, task-oriented, and instrumental). Informality 
is implicitly assumed, endogenously embraced, and flexibly enforced by horizontal peer 
pressures in a particularistic and personalized process (e.g., subjective, non-rational, 
people-oriented, and sentimental) (Li, 2007). Formality and informality can be reflected in 
various domains of business exchanges, including customer relationships, public relationships, 
and R&D collaborative relationships, all of which are critical for new ventures (Brush, Greene, 
& Hart, 2001).  
Customer relationships stand for the orientation of market-based activities, which are 
fundamental to a firm’s survival and growth (Day & Montgomery, 1999). Formal customer 
relationships are rooted in transactional marketing, where the marketing activities focus on 
impersonal advantages of differentiated product features and low cost advantages (Coviello, 
Brodie, Danaher, & Johnston, 2002). In contrast, informal customer relationships are based on 
relationship marketing, which emphasizes identifying, establishing, maintaining, and 
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enhancing relationships with customers in an informal and personal way (Gronroos, 1990).  
Public relationships represent a firm’s non-market based activities, focusing on public 
stakeholders, such as governments, political groups, trade associations and communities, are 
important (Clarkson, 1995). A formal orientation denotes a strategic approach to maintaining 
public stakeholder relationships and conforming to prescribed, explicit codes through 
objectives and impersonal processes sanctioned by legal powers (Sharratt, Brigham & 
Brigham, 2007). In contrast, firms with an informal orientation cultivate public stakeholder 
relationships through interpersonal processes sanctioned by social power (e.g., trust and 
reputation) and mutual interests (Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009).  
R&D collaborative relationships refer to how a firm engages and controls its R&D 
partnership with other organizations, which is important for the firm to build sustainable 
competitive advantages in high-tech industries. Firms in favor of formal mechanisms in R&D 
collaborations rely on hierarchical authority or detailed, explicit contractual specifications 
(Das & Teng, 2001). Firms in favor of informal elements in R&D collaborations emphasize 
social mechanisms and implicit mutual understanding (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).  
Although prior studies have deepened our understanding about the importance of 
formality and informality in intra-firm and inter-firm relationships, our knowledge is still 
limited in several aspects. First, formal mechanisms dominate market exchanges (Peng, 2003) 
in Western developed economies, while informal mechanisms fill the voids of formal 
mechanisms in emerging markets (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Such 
differences in institutional environments may influence the strategic approaches adopted by 
 9 
 
entrepreneurs in developed and emerging economies. However, it is unclear how entrepreneurs 
exposed to transnational institutions balance formality and informality in business exchanges. 
Second, while it is widely agreed that entrepreneurs’ strategic decisions co-evolve with 
institutional environments (Peng & Zhou, 2005), there is the question of how entrepreneurs 
with different levels of exposure to transnational contexts change their formal-informal 
balances over time. Further, there is an ongoing debate regarding whether the 
formality-informality balance is complementary (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2004; Li, 2007) or 
substitutive (e.g., North, 1990; Peng, 2003). The current research is to shed light on the nature 
of the formality-informality balance within the context of ‘West meets East’ and increasing 
mobility of returnees to China.    
 
METHOD 
We chose the comparative multi-case study method for two reasons. First, case studies allow 
researchers to develop a holistic understanding of real-life phenomena and are preferred when 
researchers attempt to understand complex social events. Second, comparative multi-case 
studies allow us to compare local entrepreneurs with returnee entrepreneurs, investigate the 
systematic differences between them and illustrate the dynamic changes of such differences.  
Returnee and local entrepreneurs in Chinese high-tech industries provide an ideal research 
setting for understanding how entrepreneurs with different prior exposure to the Western or 
Eastern institutions manage customer relationships, public relationships, and R&D 
collaborative relationships through balancing formality and informality. To explore the 
 10 
 
differences between returnee and local entrepreneurs, we focused on the early stage of 
venturing. First, the early stage of venturing is critical because ventures are subject to the 
liability of newness and thus suffer from higher risk of failure (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). 
Second, after returning to their home country, returnee entrepreneurs face the challenges of 
readjusting to the local institutional environment (Gaw, 2000). Therefore, focusing on the early 
stage of venturing enables us to observe how returnee entrepreneurs balance formality and 
informality when they face the strong institutional differences. To explore the dynamic 
changes of returnee and local entrepreneurs, we compare the balance of formality and 
informality at the later stage with that at the early stage of venturing. We consider the first three 
years of a new venture as the early stage and subsequent years that as the later stage. 
The study sample consists of six firms established by the alumni of a top university in 
China, including three from the biotech industry and three from the new energy industry. We 
chose these two industries for three reasons. First, both biotech and new energy industries are 
among the seven Strategic Emerging Industries identified by the Chinese central 
government.[1] Thus, domestic institutions (e.g., industry policies) have important impacts on 
the survival and growth of firms in these industries. Second, the two industries are deeply 
integrated with the global market, and thus, firms in these industries are affected by institutions 
in developed countries. Third, the high demand of resources for firms in these two high-tech 
industries requires that entrepreneurs adapt to local institutional contexts and institutional 
changes. Thus, the chosen industries are an appropriate setting to examine the two research 
questions. In choosing returnee entrepreneurs, we focused on those who had spent a 
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considerable period of time in developed economies. The founders of the three returnee firms 
had overseas experiences of 10, 13, and 15 years, respectively, in the United States. 
Information on the sampled firms and their founders is in Table 1. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Data Collection 
We relied on several data sources, including interviews, phone calls, e-mails, and archival data, 
such as internal documents, websites, and news articles. The triangulation of data sources 
provides accurate information and improves the reliability of the case findings (Anand, 
Gardner, & Morris, 2007). The primary data source was 45 semi-structured interviews with 
open-ended questions during 2011 to 2013. We first interviewed highly knowledgeable 
informants who were founders or co-founders of the firms and then asked them to identify 
other informants who were directly involved in the entrepreneurship process. We interviewed 
at least 4 informants for each firm. All interviews were conducted in Chinese. 
We used open-ended questions that gave the informants a wide scope to reveal the most 
important events regarding customer, public and R&D collaborative relationships. To gain 
more complete information (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), we prompted the informants to 
provide more details when their descriptions were brief or when novel narrative strands 
emerged. The interviewees were asked to provide a comprehensive account of their actions 
related to the three domains at the early stage of their entrepreneurship. To control for recall 
biases, we asked the informants about the most important events in their entrepreneurship and 
asked other informants to confirm the information. All interviews were recorded and 
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transcribed in Chinese, mostly within 24 hours. 
We also used closed-ended questions to ask the entrepreneurs to evaluate the importance 
of formality and informality in the three domains. For example, the respondents were asked to 
provide a ratio of formal to informal mechanisms in managing customer relationships at the 
very beginning of entrepreneurship as well as at present. Using these quantitative data, we 
compared entrepreneurs’ emphases on formal and informal mechanisms and dynamic shifts of 
the dominant mechanism over time. 
We addressed potential informant biases in several ways. First, we interviewed various 
informants with different management positions in the sampled firms. Second, we used 
‘courtroom questioning’ that focused on factual accounts of what informants did themselves or 
what the informants observed others did regarding customer relationships, public relationships 
and R&D collaborations. We avoided asking informant speculative questions (e.g., ‘Why did 
this transaction succeed’?). Third, we triangulated data from multiple informants and archival 
sources (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993). Fourth, our informants were motivated to give 
accurate information because they were eager to know how they were different from their 
counterparts in managing entrepreneurial processes. Such strong interest among informants 
improved the accuracy of their accounts (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). We also promised 
confidentiality of their answers.  
 
Case Analysis 
We used within-case and cross-case analyses with no priori hypotheses (Eisenhardt & 
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Graebner, 2007). We began by writing individual cases based on interviews and archival data. 
We triangulated the data and focused on pre-conceived themes that received support from 
different data sources and that were agreed upon by the authors. We conducted a second round 
of interviews to fill in missing details. The transcript for each case was between 40 to 90 pages, 
including words, pictures and charts. Two of the authors reviewed the cases to form 
independent views and wrote notes. We then synthesized these views for each firm. 
We then performed within-case analysis, taking a single firm as the unit of analysis. First, 
we coded the events, actions or interviewees’ thoughts into three pre-conceived categories (i.e., 
the three domains of customer relationship, public relationship, and R&D collaborative 
relationship). Then, we used open-coding to identify and illustrate each detailed process in 
plain language. One author and a trained Ph.D. student implemented this coding process 
separately and then convened to determine the categorization for axial coding. According to 
the definition and characteristics of formality and informality (Li, 2007; Misztal, 2002), we 
coded the processes of impersonal contacts, explicit rules, tight enforcement and hierarchical 
authorities as elements that fit the category of formality. We coded the processes of 
interpersonal contacts, implicitly shared-values, loose cooperation and social sanctions under 
the category of informality. The inter-coder agreement was 99% of all the items coded. The 
coding scheme is shown in Figure 1. 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
We conducted cross-case analyses using replication logic across the sampled firms to 
perform a broad search for consistent patterns (Yin, 2003). We used tables to compare returnee 
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and local firms, highlighting similarities and differences. For example, both returnee and local 
firms show different levels of effort to build personal relationships with potential customers as 
well as distinct differences in their efforts to market through explicit advantages in 
technologies or services. Returnee entrepreneurs expressed a relative emphasis on the objective 
advantages in product features, while local entrepreneurs expressed a relative focus on 
personal communication and relationship with potential customers. Using replication logic, we 
examined the patterns from some cases in the sample to develop preliminary relationships and 
then analyze the remaining cases to validate and refine the emergent theory.  
Once our cross-case analysis was underway, we compared theory, case data, and the 
literature to refine the theoretical relationships (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We continued until we 
achieved a strong match between cases and theory in a coherent manner. Then, the quotes used 
in this study were translated into English. 
 
RESULTS 
The Asymmetrical Pattern of Formality-Informality Balance  
For the first research question, ‘how do local and returnee entrepreneurs who have different 
prior exposure to the Western or Eastern institutional context balance formality and informality 
in their business exchanges when they start new ventures in their home country (i.e., China)?’, 
we explored how returnee and local entrepreneurs balanced formal and informal elements in 
the domains of customer, public and R&D collaborative relationships at the early stage of 
entrepreneurship. Overall, the results showed that returnee entrepreneurs preferred formal to 
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informal elements, but local entrepreneurs preferred informal to formal elements. Table 2 
summarizes the case evidence in each of the three domains. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Customer relationships. In this domain, the case evidence clearly showed that while both 
returnee and local firms simultaneously used formal and informal mechanisms to acquire 
customers, they placed different emphasis on each. Returnee firms deemed formal elements, 
such as advocating the advantages of their products and using an impersonal process, as the 
dominant mechanisms to attract and retain customers. In contrast, local firms placed a strong 
emphasis on informal elements, such as building personal relationships and engaging in 
unofficial or informal contacts to manage a customer base.  
R1-Energy, a returnee firm, mainly relied on its advanced business model to attract 
customers at the beginning. As the president recalled, ‘It was our distinctive competitive 
advantage that earned us market shares. We emphasized our capability to provide integrated 
solutions to customers, which differentiated us from competitors’. Meanwhile, the firm also 
recruited local salesmen to access local customers through personal contacts. In comparing the 
importance of formal elements with that of informal elements, the president of R1-Energy gave 
a ratio of 9:1 (sum of 10). The percentages of transcripts coded as formal or informal elements 
in customer relationships for R1-Energy were 66.7% vs. 33.3%.  
L2-Energy, a local firm, placed a strong emphasis on informal elements in managing 
customer relationships. The president elaborated that ‘I let every customer feel my affection 
and earnestness. Even after a deal was closed, I sent cards and messages to our customers 
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during every important festival to maintain our friendships’. The local entrepreneur also hired 
experts and academic institutes to improve the firm’s technologies. However, cultivating 
affection was considered the key factor by the president. He indicated a 4:6 ratio of the firm’s 
effort in technology improvement to personal relationship building when the firm was founded. 
The percentages of transcripts coded as informal and formal elements in customer relationships 
for L2-Energy were 75.0% and 25.0%, respectively.  
 
Public relationships. In this domain, both returnee and local entrepreneurs realized the 
importance of obtaining support from public stakeholders through both formal and informal 
mechanisms. However, returnee entrepreneurs strived for stakeholders’ support through open 
competition and passively complied with explicit regulations. In contrast, local entrepreneurs 
actively built personal connections with public stakeholders and embraced social obligations in 
informal ways.  
R2-Biotech, a returnee firm, sought government support through open bidding based on 
explicit criteria. As the administrative director noted, ‘The government would announce a 
bidding invitation. Then we would compete based on capability and be evaluated by a panel of 
industry experts’. Furthermore, R2-Biotech deemed capability as the key to governmental 
support and avoided close relationships with the government because ‘it may distract our focus 
from innovation’. The president estimated the ratio of formal elements to informal elements in 
public relationships as 8:2. The percentages of transcripts coded as formal and informal 
elements in public relationships for R2-Energy were 72.7% and 27.3%, respectively.  
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L2-Energy, founded by a local entrepreneur, actively looked for support from the 
government and the local community through informal channels and shared values. The 
president utilized his personal connections and sent a report to the top-ranking officials, 
emphasizing the profound influence of the waste incineration industry and received positive 
feedback, which triggered a media upsurge advocating L2-Energy as a successful example. 
L2-Energy also invited one peasant per household to work in the factory to ‘build a 
harmonious community through the involvement of employees’. Moreover, the president of 
L2-Energy considered personal relationships to be the most critical factor in public 
relationships. His weight of emphasis on formal elements to informal elements in public 
relationships was 2:8. The percentages of transcripts coded as informal and formal elements in 
public relationships for L2-Energy were 88.9% and 11.1%, respectively.  
 
R&D collaborative relationships. In general, we found that although both returnee and local 
firms used formal and informal mechanisms to manage R&D collaborations simultaneously, 
returnee firms relied more on hierarchical authorities and explicit, codified contracts, while 
local firms were more inclined to adopt social mechanisms based on interpersonal connections, 
trust and implicit agreements.  
R3-Biotech, the returnee firm, kept most of its core technologies under internal hierarchies 
and formed ad-hoc collaborations based on profit maximization. As the CEO noted, ‘We 
collaborated with others as long as each of us could benefit and gain a profit’. R3-Biotech also 
accessed technological information through informal meetings in industry alliances. However, 
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formal elements played a dominant role in R&D collaborations. The president rated the ratio of 
formal elements to informal elements in R&D collaborations as 6:4. The percentages of 
transcripts coded as formal and informal elements in R&D collaborative relationships for 
R3-Biotech were 66.7% and 33.3%, respectively.  
The local firm L1-Energy mainly relied on personal connections and implicit agreements 
to manage R&D collaborations at the early stage. L1-Energy cooperated with a top ranking 
institute by leveraging personal relationships. As the president said, ‘At first, we were not 
competitive enough to collaborate with the top ranking institute. Fortunately, I knew an expert 
who was renowned and familiar with the principal of the institute… Without him, we could 
have never formed the alliance’. In addition, L1-Energy took advantage of implicit 
agreements. As the president noted, ‘We named our product after the institute’s name for the 
first two years. Actually, we didn’t have any explicit agreements in our contract. But we 
considered it as an implicit agreement took advantages of this grey area’. Informal elements 
played a dominant role in L1-Energy’s R&D collaborations. The VP recalled that at the early 
stage of venturing, the ratio of informal elements to formal elements in governing R&D 
collaborations was 6:4. The percentages of transcripts coded as informal and formal elements 
in R&D collaborative relationships for L1-Energy were 85.7% and 14.3%, respectively.  
Case evidence also showed that at the early stage of venturing, both returnee and local 
entrepreneurs viewed formal elements and informal elements as simultaneously 
complementary and substitutive in the three domains. On the one hand, formal and informal 
elements are considered indispensable and complementary. The president of R1-Energy 
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suggested that ‘Competences of the firm and informal relationships can facilitate each other 
and generate synergies. If you are strong in technological competence, people will consider 
you reliable, thus promoting customer relationships. If you have close relationships with 
customers, you can gain more opportunities to improve the firm’s competence’. On the other 
hand, the entrepreneurs mentioned a partial substitution between formal and informal 
elements. As the president of R3-Biotech noted, ‘While some issues could not be specified in a 
contract, basic consensus and a shared understanding could supplement to resolve the issues’. 
The VP of L1-Energy also mentioned, ‘Sometimes when products are homogenous, 
trustworthy relationships with customers can be supplementary to achieve success’. Table 3 
summarizes the case evidence about complementarity and substitution in each domain. 
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
The Transitional Pattern of Formality-Informality Balancing  
To answer our second research question, ‘how do local and returnee entrepreneurs shift their 
specific balances between formality and informality in their business exchanges over time?’, 
we compared the dynamic patterns of formal-informal balance adopted by the returnee and 
local firms in the three domains. We found that, over time, both returnee and local firms began 
to place a greater emphasis on formal elements. While the returnee firms placed increasing 
emphasis on informal elements, the local firms attached more importance to formal elements 
over time. Table 4 summarizes the case evidence in the three domains. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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------------------------------------------- 
Customer relationships. We found that returnee firms were more committed to informal 
elements such as building local sales teams and developing relationship marketing over time. 
In contrast, local firms increasingly adopted formal mechanisms, focusing on technology and 
product improvement. 
R3-Biotech, a returnee firm, had been gradually hiring local people with local experience 
to communicate with potential customers. As the CEO mentioned, ‘Returnees are not familiar 
with how to build interpersonal relationships with domestic customers. We are now recruiting a 
local sales team to do relationship marketing’. Moreover, while the CEO’s rating of the 
importance of formal elements vs. informal elements for the year 2009 when the firm was 
founded was 7:3, the rating changed to 6:4 for 2013. This change indicates that the returnee 
firm had strengthened the informal mechanisms to attract customers, but formal mechanisms 
still dominated in customer relationships.  
In contrast, the local firm, L2-Energy, began to deliberately improve its operation 
efficiency after 2 years of development. The president stated: ‘We relied on guanxi to attract 
customers before. But now we need to emphasize more the quality of our products and the 
superior operation model’. Moreover, the relative emphasis had shifted from informal to 
formal elements. The rating of the two elements in customer relationships was 4:6 for 2009 
when the venture was founded, while the rating changed to 7:3 for 2013.  
 
Public relationships. In the domain of public relationships, we observed that returnee 
entrepreneurs were beginning to build personal relationships and trust with public stakeholders 
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through informal channels over time. Meanwhile, local entrepreneurs increasingly emphasized 
technology and product advantages to gain support from public stakeholders and shifted their 
focus from informality to formality.  
The returnee firm, R1-Energy, had been engaged in social activities two years after their 
founding. In 2011, R1-Energy initiated and sponsored a top-class international new energy 
competition with the U.S. National Energy Administration and the Chinese government in 
order ‘to build a socially responsible image’. However, they still maintained the dominant role 
of formal elements. As the president commented: ‘Although the Chinese government may be 
influenced by “guanxi”, eventually it needs to support firms with leading technologies as 
required by the regulations’. The president’s rating of the ratio between the two mechanisms in 
public relationships had changed from 8:2 in 2009 to 7:3 in 2013, indicating that more attention 
had been paid to leverage informal elements, but formal elements still dominated. 
The local firm, L1-Energy, had been increasingly investing in technology advantages to 
achieve governmental support six years after its founding. As the president stated, ‘We have 
passed the government authentication and become one of the few national enterprise 
technology centers in the province’. The rating of formal-informal elements for public 
relationships changed from 4:6 in 2002 to 6:4 in 2013, indicating an increasing investment in 
formal elements and a shift toward dominance of formal elements.  
 
R&D collaborative relationships. In this domain, we also found that returnee firms were more 
inclined to use social mechanisms, while local firms increasingly relied on authority and 
 22 
 
explicit contracts and shifted their relative emphasis from informal to formal elements.  
R2-Biotech, a returnee firm, had intensified the role of social power (e.g., trust and 
reliability) in R&D collaboration over time. For example, in collaboration with a hospital, the 
two parties communicated extensively and collaborated without contracts at the early stage 
because they both trusted the principal in the project. However, formal elements still played a 
dominant role. The president’s rating of the importance of formal vs. informal elements in 
R&D collaboration changed from 9:1 in 2007 to 7:3 in 2013.  
Conversely, the local firm L2-Energy, which had been relying on interpersonal 
cooperation, started to emphasize explicit contracts and rules in R&D collaborations. The 
president of L2-Energy noted, ‘In collaboration with a foreign institute, the main mechanism 
we used is contract and economic objectives’. In addition, the rating of the two elements in 
managing R&D collaborations for L1-Energy changed from 4:6 in 2009 to 7:3 in 2013.  
 
We also observed that as firms developed, both returnee and local firms aimed to achieve 
synergies through integrating the two elements, thus striving to attain a more balanced 
relationship between formal and informal elements than at the early stage of their venture 
development. For returnee firms, as the President of R3-Biotech suggested, ‘Now we need to 
strengthen our local sales forces to build personal relationships with customers in order to 
complement product advantages’. Further evidence reveals that the increasing emphasis on 
informal elements is accompanied by accumulated trust and communication experience in 
adjusting to the Chinese context. For example, the administration director of R2-Bioteh said, 
‘Over time, the government had accumulated trust and familiarity with our firm, which can 
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complement our technological capability to achieve governmental support’.  
Similarly, local entrepreneurs integrated the two elements as they reinforced their 
investment in technological advantage. As the President of L2-Energy noted, ‘it is not feasible 
to rely only on social sanctions. We need to use formal contracts to achieve common goals’. 
Moreover, local entrepreneurs realized that formal elements provide ultimate value in the 
relationship, especially in the transition toward a market-based economy. As the president of 
L3-Biotech mentioned, ‘ultimately, customers are paying money to satisfy their needs’. Table 5 
summaries the emphasis on synergy between the two sets of firms.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
Research Propositions 
The case evidence delineates two emerging patterns of the formality-informality balance. The 
first pattern (spatial) can be termed ‘asymmetrical balancing’, which relates to the first research 
question. At the early stage of venturing, both groups of entrepreneurs adopted formality and 
informality simultaneously in all the three domains with either formality or informality as 
dominant. Returnee entrepreneurs tended to emphasize formality over informality in an 
asymmetrical pattern, while the local entrepreneurs focused more on informality. For a general 
spatial pattern, we propose the new construct asymmetrical pattern of formal-informal balance 
and develop two propositions: 
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Proposition 1a: At the early stage of venturing, returnee firms tend to balance formality 
and informality in their business exchanges in an asymmetrical pattern, with formality 
being the dominant element.  
 
Proposition 1b: At the early stage of venturing, local firms tend to balance formality and 
informality in their business exchanges in an asymmetrical pattern, with informality being 
the dominant element. 
 
This asymmetrical pattern derives primarily from the two different institutional contexts to 
which the two groups of entrepreneurs had been exposed prior to the start of venturing in 
China. Since returnee entrepreneurs were more exposed to the Western institutional context, 
they place the dominant focus on market-based rules and depersonalized processes. In contrast, 
local entrepreneurs are exposed to the Eastern institutional context at home, with a strong 
preference for informal processes and network-based strategies (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
Existing studies have found that variation in formal institutions (e.g., regulations and laws) and 
informal institutions (e.g., values, norms, and social expectations) influences the governance of 
entrepreneurial firms, including how entrepreneurs acquire necessary resources and manage 
external relationships (Bruton et al., 2010; Welter, 2011). For example, Luo (2007) found that 
in international joint ventures, managers from individualist cultures tend to rely more on 
formal anti-opportunism mechanisms, while managers from collectivistic cultures tend to rely 
more on informal anti-opportunism mechanisms. Zhang et al. (2009) have shown that when the 
legal infrastructure for enforcing formal contracts is not effective, informal relationships such 
as guanxi play an indispensable and vital role in the successful operations of public-private 
partners in Chinese society. These findings have been further confirmed by Batjargal, Hitt, 
Tsui, Arregle, Webb, and Miller (2013). Their study revealed that entrepreneurs in weak and 
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inefficient formal institutional contexts tend to use structural holes as a substitute for rules. 
This implies that entrepreneurs from different institutional contexts with varying degrees of 
formal and informal institutions may exhibit different preferences for formality or informality 
in managing transactions. 
We further observed from the case evidence that formal and informal elements could be 
simultaneously complementary and substitutive. For a long time, many scholars regarded 
formal and informal elements as substitutes in the belief that the presence of one element 
obviates the need for the other (e.g., Larson, 1992). More recently, however, some scholars 
have begun to take formal and informal elements not as mutually exclusive but as 
complementary. It is argued that in situations with severe exchange hazard, the combination of 
formal and informal mechanisms may deliver better exchange performance than either 
orientation in isolation (Poppo & Zender, 2002). This view is highly consistent with research 
on ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Differing from the 
above two views, the case evidence shows that both returnee and local entrepreneurs took 
formal and informal elements as partially complementary for synergy and also partially 
substitutive for tradeoff. This unique pattern of asymmetrical balancing represents a strategy 
above and beyond the debate of taking formal and informal elements as either a fully 
conflicting tradeoff or fully complementary synergy.  
Contrary to the Western ‘either/or’ logic, this unique pattern is rooted in the traditional 
Chinese philosophy of asymmetrical balancing, the first operating mechanism of Yin-Yang 
balancing (Li, 2012b, 2014). It posits that the opposite elements are partially conflicting for 
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partial tradeoff and partially complementary for partial synergy (相生相克 in Chinese). 
Therefore, they must adopt an asymmetrical pattern to maximize their partial synergy and 
minimize their partial tradeoff. The rationale for asymmetrical balancing is that opposite 
elements tend to be more complementary and less conflicting when one element is more 
dominant than the other; in contrast, opposite elements tend to be more conflicting and less 
complementary when both elements are equally dominant (Li, 2014). 
The second pattern (temporal) can be termed ‘transitional balancing’, emerging from the 
evidence exclusively concerning the second research question. Over time, both types of firms 
converged gradually to a more moderate balance compared with the initial more asymmetrical 
balance. In particular, returnee entrepreneurs gradually changed the balance with an increasing 
emphasis on informal elements (with formal elements remaining the dominant), while local 
entrepreneurs gradually shifted towards a rebalance with a greater emphasis on formal 
elements (even to the extent that formal elements become the dominant pattern than the initial 
pattern). For a general temporal pattern, we propose the new construct transitional pattern of 
formal-informal balance and develop two propositions:  
 
Proposition 2a: Over time, returnee firms tend to put increasing emphasis on informality 
in their business exchanges in a transitional pattern but are likely to continue keeping 
formality as the dominant element during this transition, resulting in a moderate 
asymmetrical balance. 
 
Proposition 2b: Over time, local firms tend to put increasing emphasis on formality in 
their business exchanges in a transitional pattern and are likely to gradually adopt 
formality as the dominant element during this transition, resulting in a moderate 
asymmetrical balance. 
 
The different dynamics of returnee and local firms in the same institutional context are 
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likely a result of the joint effect of their prior institutional exposure and current institutional 
pressure. Previous studies have found that, over time, firms will be affected by the isomorphic 
mechanism of local institutions (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). For returnee entrepreneurs, the 
effect of exposure to the Western institutional context was more visible at the early stage of 
venturing. Once they have gradually established themselves in the local market and gained a 
deeper understanding about the local business norms and how their local peers manage 
business exchanges, they bend to conform to the local norms. Local firms coevolved with the 
institutional transitions in the emerging market (Peng, 2003). Emerging economies went 
through ‘fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the institutional rules of the 
game that affect firms as players’ (Peng, 2003: 275), which are collectively known as 
"institutional transitions" and which favor economic liberalization and the adoption of 
free-market systems (Meyer & Peng, 2005). China has been aiming to build a rule-based 
market system incorporating international best practice institutions since implementing the 
reform and opening policy. These transitions include government decentralization, the 
privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and conformity to international uniform 
rules. Previous studies have found that in institutional changes toward rule-based economies in 
emerging markets, such as China, firms operating there tend to shift from a personalized to a 
depersonalized mode (Dieleman & Sachs, 2006; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). 
Consistent with the prior literature, we observed that formal elements have become 
increasingly important in local firms in parallel with the advance of formal institutions in 
China. However, China’s economic transition is incomplete (Hoskisson et al., 2013), and local 
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connections or guanxi are still important (Li, Zhang, & Lyles, 2013). Hence, returnee 
entrepreneurs who had been exposed to the West with a higher degree of formality still need to 
strengthen informality to conform to the institutional context in the emerging market. The 
above discussion suggests that the impact of prior institutional exposure can fade over time, 
while current institutional exposure may trigger the isomorphic change of all firms to converge 
to a similar pattern.  
Another insight from the case evidence is the increasing emphasis on synergies between 
formality and informality as both groups of firms grow. At a later stage of venturing, both 
returnee and local firms tend to emphasize synergy by integrating formal and informal 
elements rather than tradeoff by substituting one for another. In particular, returnee firms tried 
to complement formal elements with informal elements as they accumulated more experience 
and adapted to the strong informal institutions in the local context. In contrast, local firms 
increasingly emphasized formal elements to complement informal elements as they realized 
the essence of market economy principles and gradually adjust their conformity in the 
institutional transition toward a rule-based economy. In other words, the increasing demand for 
synergies is another driving force for the change of formal-informal balance, complementary to 
the institutional pressure. However, most of the local firms not only placed stronger emphasis 
on formality but also shifted from an informality-dominant balancing to a formality-dominant 
balancing. This shift implies that the institutional transition toward a rule-based economy 
pushed local firms to adopt formal elements as their dominant approach. The dynamic 
capability of Chinese entrepreneurs in reacting to the institutional environment flexibly and 
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shifting between formal and informal elements effortlessly is rooted in the Chinese philosophy 
of transitional balancing, the second operating mechanism of Yin-Yang balancing (Li, 2012b, 
2014). This operating mechanism is based on the same principle of having both partial tradeoff 
and partial synergy as the inner source of mutual transitions, which are often triggered by the 
dramatic changes in the external context. This insight further suggests that a moderate 
asymmetrical balance is more desirable as firms grow. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
As in all research, there may be alternative explanations that may undermine the proposed 
argument. First, the different patterns we observed between returnee and local entrepreneurs 
could be attributed to pre-existing individual differences. However, the sampled firms in the 
study were mainly established by alumni of a top university in China. Although there may exist 
some variations in personal characteristics, such pre-existing differences could be relatively 
small given that they all were educated in the same university before some of them went 
abroad. Further, we observed a case among the sampled firms (L3-Biotech) which showed 
some serious conflicts between the local founder and one of his college classmates who joined 
the company after studying and working overseas for several years. Our interviews with the 
local founder and his partner clearly showed that the conflicts were not caused by pre-existed 
differences in the past but by their later exposure to different institutional environments. A 
second possible explanation is that the cohort effect (i.e., the year of founding) affects firms’ 
formal-informal balance patterns. This may offer insights into the experiences of L1-Energy 
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and L3-Biotech because both were founded in the 2000s, when China was still at the stage of 
network-based economies. However, this assumption cannot explain the strong preference for 
informality by L2-Energy, which was founded in 2009, when China was undergoing a 
transition towards rule-based economies for more than 30 years. Therefore, the cohort effect 
cannot explain the systematic differences in our sample. 
A third explanation for the different patterns between returnee and local firms is the 
different resource endowments due to different levels of exposure to developed or emerging 
economies. Returnee entrepreneurs may have technological advantages that provide the 
foundation for a formal approach in business exchanges, while local entrepreneurs may have 
stronger social networks in home countries to support informal mechanisms. This explanation 
may complement our institutional explanation because firms need to pursue legitimacy and 
efficiency; the former is affected by exogenous institutions, whereas the latter is influenced by 
internal resources. As shown in the case evidence, the asymmetrical pattern is mainly attributed 
to the prior institutional exposure. In addition, we observed that returnees also had social 
relationships in China, although not as extensive as local entrepreneurs. The reason for their 
preference is not the quantity or quality of social ties, but the fact that returnee entrepreneurs 
did not want to or did not know how to utilize their personal relationships at the early stage of 
their return. In summary, we admit that resource endowments due to different levels of 
institutional exposure is a possible endogenous explanation, complementary to the explanation 
of the institutional context.  
Finally, the accumulation of resources over time in the local institutional environment also 
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can be an endogenous explanation for the transitional pattern of returnee and local firms. For 
example, over time returnee entrepreneurs could have expanded their social networks and 
become more experienced in how to apply those ties, so they appear to increasingly emphasize 
informal elements. However, this assumption cannot explain the dynamic shift from 
informality to formality among the local firms. Therefore, the explanation of the co-evolution 
with the institutional transition toward a rule-based economy is still necessary to explain the 
pattern. In this sense, we acknowledge the accumulation of resources over time as a 
complementary explanation for the temporal pattern of formal-informal balance, but this 
cannot substitute for the effect of the local institutional context. 
 
Theoretical Contributions  
This study makes three contributions. First, it contributes to the transnational entrepreneurship 
literature by exploring the effect of entrepreneurs’ prior exposure to different institutional 
contexts on new ventures’ formal-informal balance as they establish ventures in their original 
home countries and its convergence in accordance with the evolution of domestic institutions 
over time. Although prior research has demonstrated the effect of local institutions on 
entrepreneurs (Bruton et al., 2010), our study goes one step further by examining the influence 
of prior exposure to the institutional context. Second, the study contributes to the 
formality-informality literature by highlighting the idea of asymmetrical balancing. The third 
contribution is the insight that the balance between formality and informality is a dynamic 
rather than a static process, thus the need for transitional balancing. 
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The last two contributions have critical implications for institutional research and paradox 
management. Specifically, the two contributions directly challenge the long-standing debate 
over the relationship between formal and informal elements in terms of framing them from the 
perspective of “either/or” logic, which treats the link between opposites as either fully 
conflicting or fully complementary in all spatial aspects and at all temporal stages (Smith & 
Lewis, 2011). In this study, however, we not only found that formality and informality can be 
partially complementary and partially substitutive but also found that firms tend to shift toward 
synergy rather than tradeoff as they grow. In other words, the formality-informality link is both 
conflicting and complementary in all aspects and at all times because, like all pairs of opposite 
elements, it should be taken as a duality (defined as opposites-in-unity for partial synergy and 
partial tradeoff, or 相生相克 in Chinese) in need of holistic and dynamic balances. This 
fundamental insight is rooted in the Yin-Yang balance (Fang, 2012; Jing & Van de Ven, 2014; 
Li, 2008, 2012a, 2012b, 2014).  
 
Limitations 
We acknowledge some limitations of our study. First, the sampled returnees came from one 
host country (i.e., the United States). Future studies could sample two groups of returnee 
entrepreneurs from different host countries with different formal-informal institutions (e.g., 
Japan, where informal elements play important roles, and the United States, where formal 
elements dominate) to examine whether returnee entrepreneurs’ preferences still depend on 
prior institutional exposure (i.e., Japan and the United States) . Second, Although all the six 
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firms are in rapid growth and good financial statues during the time of our interviews, which 
indicates that these firms may benefit from asymmetrical and transitional balancing, we did not 
have their specific performance information to draw conclusions about the impact of the 
formality-informality balance on performance. It would be interesting to explicitly study the 
performance consequence of asymmetrical and transitional balancing. Third, we only observed 
the trend of change; we did not reveal the speed of the transitions. It is valuable to conduct 
longitudinal studies to reveal detailed dynamic patterns of entrepreneurship, including both 
pattern, and speed, in a transnational and transitional context. Finally, our findings are based on 
case evidence from a single emerging economy. Because returnee and local entrepreneurship in 
emerging economies is a global phenomenon, future research should be extended to other 
emerging economies to explore either the generalizability of the findings from this study or to 
reveal variances in different institutional environments and institutional dynamics. Lastly, we 
focus on firms founded by either returnee or local entrepreneurs. This does not allow us to 
understand the patterns of formality and informality in ventures founded by partnership 
between returnee and local entrepreneurs.  
 
Managerial Implications  
The findings from the study have a number of managerial implications for entrepreneurs and 
managers. First, both returnee and local entrepreneurs would benefit from knowing how to 
achieve a proper balance between formal and informal elements to effectively manage business 
exchanges. Specifically, returnee entrepreneurs may want to devote greater effort into 
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developing mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders in emerging markets. For local 
entrepreneurs, establishing internal technological capability is crucial when the business 
environment evolves from a more relationship-based to a more market-based system where 
technological advantage is important. Second, entrepreneurs operating in emerging markets 
should consider the merit of a more balanced perspective. The frame of Yin-Yang balancing 
can help entrepreneurs and managers to appreciate management tension and turn paradoxical 
tension into balanced outcomes. Finally, the findings suggest that returnee and local 
entrepreneurs can learn from each other and cooperate to utilize their complementary 
capability. More specifically, returnee entrepreneurs can learn from local entrepreneurs to 
utilize informal mechanisms, while local entrepreneurs can gain insights from returnee 
entrepreneurs to enhance their utilization of formal mechanisms. They, as some already do, 
may form mutually beneficial partnerships as co-founders of new ventures. However, we offer 
this implication with some trepidation because such ventures also may incur conflict due to 
vastly different logic between the two types of entrepreneurs. Research is needed to understand 
such partnership ventures.  
 
CONCLUSION  
In the contexts of ‘West-meets-East’ and globalization, we have explored both the distinctions 
and similarities between returnee and local entrepreneurs to enrich our knowledge about 
entrepreneurship in a transnational context as well as their dynamic co-evolution with 
institutional contexts. Focusing on the balance between formality and informality at the early 
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stage of venturing and its evolution over time by comparing returnee and local entrepreneurs in 
emerging economies using a comparative case study method, we have addressed two critical 
research gaps on how entrepreneurs with different exposure to the Western and the Eastern 
institutional contexts balance formal and informal elements at the early stage of venturing and 
how the shift in such balances occurs over time. The critical theoretical and practical 
implications of this study are associated with the Eastern frame of Yin-Yang balancing. More 
indigenous research would be desirable to shed additional insights into other phenomena 
related to management and entrepreneurship embedded in the interaction between Eastern and 
Western perspectives under the theme of ‘West-meets-East’. 
 
NOTES 
The paper was partially funded by research grants from the National Science Foundation of 
China (#71172020) and Guanghua-Cisco Leadership Institute. 
 
[1] The seven strategic emerging industries include energy-saving and environmental 
protection, information technology, biology, advanced equipment manufacturing, new energy, 
new materials and new-energy vehicles. 
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Table	1.	Description	of	cases	
Firm Name Industry Returnee / Local 
Firm 
Founding 
Year 
Positions (Returnee/Local 
Background) & Numbers of Informants 
Returnee Founders’ 
Overseas Experience 
(Average) 
Number of 
Interviews 
R1-Energy New energy Returnee 2009 President (R): 1 
VPs (R): 2 
CMO (L): 1 
10 years 7 
R2-Biotech Biotech Returnee 2007 President (R): 1 
Vice President (R): 1 
CTO (R): 1 
Administrative director (L): 1 
13 years 4 
R3-Biotech Biotech Returnee 2009 President (L): 1 
CEO (R): 1 
VPs (R): 2 
Director of R&D (R): 1 
CMO (L): 1 
16 years 8 
L1-Energy New energy Local 1999 President (L): 1 
CEO (L): 1 
VPs (L): 2 
CTO (L): 1 
Strategy Consultant (L): 1 
None 9 
L2-Energy New energy Local 2009 President (L): 1 
COO (L): 1 
CTO (L): 1 
Assistant President (L): 1 
None 8 
L3-Biotech Biotech Local 2002 President (L): 1 
CTO (L): 1 
CEO (L): 1 
CMO (R): 1 
None 9 
Note: (R) represents returnee entrepreneur / top manager; (L) represents local entrepreneur / top manager. 
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Table	2.	Asymmetrical	balancing	of	returnee	and	local	firms	at	the	early	stage	of	venturing	
 Customer Relationships Public Relationships R&D Collaborative Relationships 
Formal-Informal 
Ratio (by informant)1 
% of Formality  
(from coding)2
Formal-Informal Ratio 
(by informant)1
% of Formality  
(from coding)2
Formal-Informal Ratio (by 
informant)1
% of Formality  
(from coding)2
Returnee 
Firms 
9:1 (R1-Energy) 
8:2 (R2-Biotech) 
7:3 (R3-Biotech) 
66.7% (R1-Energy) 
83.3% (R2-Biotech) 
53.8% (R3-Biotech) 
8:2 (R1-Energy) 
8:2 (R2-Biotech) 
6:4 (R3-Biotech) 
60.0% (R1-Energy) 
72.7% (R2-Biotech) 
63.6% (R3-Biotech) 
7:3 (R1-Energy) 
9:1 (R2-Biotech) 
6:4 (R3-Biotech) 
71.4% (R1-Energy) 
66.7% (R2-Biotech) 
66.7% (R3-Biotech) 
Local 
Firms 
4:6 (L1-Energy) 
4:6 (L2-Energy) 
3:7 (L3-Biotech) 
15.8% (L1-Energy) 
25.0% (L2-Energy) 
33.3% (L3-Energy) 
4:6 (L1-Energy) 
1:9 (L2-Energy) 
2:8 (L3-Biotech) 
11.1% (L1-Energy) 
11.1% (L2-Energy) 
33.3% (L3-Biotech) 
4:6 (L1-Energy) 
3:7 (L2-Energy) 
2:8 (L3-Biotech) 
14.3% (L1-Energy) 
33.3% (L2-Energy) 
30.0% (L3-Biotech) 
Stronger 
emphasis 
on 
Formality 
of Returnee 
Firms 
‘Competence is the most critical element in 
achieving the deal. Personal connections 
generate the possibilities to gain access to the 
customers. But it is our distinctive competence 
that turned the “possibility” into “reality”’. 
(President of R1-Energy) 
‘Trust is a kind of relationship. But ultimately, 
you have to offer your customer quality and 
service’.(CEO of R3-Biotech) 
‘We didn’t want to spend time on building close 
relationships with government. We tried to avoid 
it. Building close relationships with the 
government or public stakeholders may distract 
our focus from innovation’. (President of 
R2-Biotech) 
‘Having political connections do not mean 
superior resources. Entrepreneurs are pursuing 
efficiency, which is judged by the market 
performance’. (President of R3-Biotech) 
‘We mainly relied on explicit and detailed contracts to 
manage R&D collaborations at the early stage. Things 
needed to be made very clear such as how to spend 
money, how to distribute the profits and when to 
complete the milestone’. (President of R1-Energy) 
‘At the beginning of entrepreneurship, we used both 
explicit contracts and mutual trust to manage R&D 
collaboration. But we mainly rely on detailed and clear 
contracts because it can better protect our interests’. 
(President of R3-Biotech) 
Stronger 
emphasis 
on 
Informality 
of Local 
Firms 
‘Actually, if we compare our investment in 
relationship marketing and product 
improvement in early stage, we invested more 
resources into building customer relationships 
including harmonious channel relationships 
and marketing activities, which did bring us 
higher profit’. (VP of L1-Energy)  
‘At the early stage of new venture, product 
improvement has very little impact on sales. In 
contrast, trust and personal relationships could 
earn the first transaction and have greater 
impact on sales’. (President of L2-Energy) 
‘Through our early years, we didn’t get explicit 
support from the government like money and 
projects. But we just kept reporting to the 
government and communicating with the officials 
actively, in order to achieve some implicit 
support’. (VP of L1-Energy) 
‘When you first communicate with the 
government, they do not know how good your 
technology is and how good your projects are. At 
this stage, personal relationship is very important 
and has the major effects. It refers to your ability to 
communicate with the officials so as to convince 
them’. (President of L2-Energy) 
‘In our early R&D collaborations, good collaborative 
relationships and mutual trust played the dominant role. 
I think explicit contracts are formats, but trust and 
understandings are foundations’. (VP of L1-Energy)  
‘In early collaborations, we mainly relied on 
establishing common goals of developing the whole 
industry. Interests are not enough to manage R&D; 
instead we need a mission to guide the collaboration’. 
(President of L2-Energy) 
Note:  
1. Formal-Informal Ratio represents the proportion of formal elements vs. the proportion of informal elements (sum of 10) used by each firm in the early stage. 
2. % of Formality represents the percentage of interview quotes coded as formal elements. 
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Table	3.	Partial	complementarity	and	partial	substitution	at	the	early	stage	of	venturing	
 Customer Relationships Public Relationships R&D Collaborative Relationships 
Quotes about 
Complementarity 
‘The personal connections of sales 
personnel will grant you access to market 
opportunities. But you need 
technological supports and services to 
realize the opportunity’. (President of 
R1-Energy)  
‘Long-term customer relationships 
complement product advantages to 
enhance sales’. (VP of R2-Biotech) 
 ‘The relationship between product and 
personal connections are just like skin 
and hair. Without skin, hair could have 
nothing to be attached to’. (President of 
L2-Energy) 
‘It has some Chinese characteristics in acquiring 
government support. It is not realistic to merely 
rely on formal mechanisms. In the Chinese 
context, both relationships and formal competition 
are indispensable’. (VP of R2-Biotech) 
‘Technology advantages and informal connections 
with the government can generate synergy to 
achieve governmental supports’. (President of 
R3-Biotech) 
 ‘The improvement in technology competence will 
facilitate your communication with the 
government. It will be much easier to 
communicate with the officials when the 
technological competitiveness of your firm is 
evident’. (President of L2-Energy) 
 ‘Contracts without relationships will not work because 
people care about “guanxi”. But when two parties have 
conflicts, clear contracts will give them a foundation to 
solve the dispute’. (President of R3-Biotech) 
‘Explicit rules and common goals are complementary to 
each other. For example, I invited some experts to 
improve the technologies. We need to establish common 
goals of boosting the industry development; we also 
need to sign formal contracts to protect each party’s 
interests. They are undivided’. (President of L2-Energy) 
‘We call it the rule of man and the rule of law. Usually, 
we complement the rule of man with the rule of law. 
However, people are good at exploiting loopholes of 
laws. So we still need to rely on the rule of man’. (CTO 
of L3-Biotech) 
Quotes about 
Substitution 
‘As a non-local firm, we have barriers in 
culture and communication. It is not easy 
to build personal relationships. However, 
because our business model is highly 
differentiated, we managed to attract 
customers’. (President of R1-Energy) 
‘We don’t do relational marketing. We 
don’t even have a sales team. Instead, we 
focus on the features of our products and 
use pictures and texts online to introduce 
our products’. (President of R2-Biotech) 
‘Sometimes when we sell some general 
product which can be bought from any 
other firms, we rely on personal 
relationships’. (CTO of L3-Biotech) 
‘Returnee entrepreneurs are not as experienced as 
local entrepreneurs in building relationships with 
the government. However, government has 
explicit tasks to attract leading technologies. They 
will search for you’. (President of R1-Energy) 
‘If you are a little weaker in technology 
competitiveness, strong capability of 
communication will supplement. If you are weaker 
in communication capability, strong technological 
capability can also help you to overcome the 
disadvantages’. (President of R3-Biotech) 
‘The formal application for national project is too 
complicated. So instead, we built good 
relationships with the government and tried to gain 
some ‘help’ from them’. (CTO of L3-Biotech)  
‘Sometimes when you have less trust in the collaborator, 
you can use more specific and detailed contracts to 
manage the cooperation’. (President of R1-Energy) 
‘Sometimes we don’t need to sign a very detailed 
contract because we have other relationships. We may 
have a familiar and trust worthy mediator; or we may 
have collaboration experience before. In these 
circumstances, we trust each other and may collaborate 
first and sign contract later’. (VP of R2-Biotech) 
‘Unofficial cooperation can substitute formal 
collaboration in some circumstances. For example, some 
institutes are competitors and they compete with each 
other, unwilling to cooperate. So rather than inviting the 
whole research team, I invited only the principal. So it 
becomes personal cooperation, not collaboration with 
university’. (President of L2-Energy) 
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Table	4.	Transitional	balancing	of	returnee	and	local	firms	from	the	early	state	to	later	stages	of	venturing	
Formality-Informality Ratio 
(Early1Later Stage 2) 
 
Customer Relationships 
 
Public Relationships 
 
R&D Collaborative Relationships 
Returnee Firms 9:1  8:2 (R1-Energy) 
8:2  6:4 (R2-Biotech) 
7:3  6:4 (R3-Biotech) 
8:2  7:3 (R1-Energy) 
8:3  7:3 (R2-Biotech) 
6:4  7:3 (R3-Biotech3) 
7:3  6:4 (R1-Energy) 
9:1  7:3 (R2-Biotech) 
6:4  7:3 (R3-Biotech 3) 
Local Firms 4:6  6:4 (L1-Energy) 
4:6  7:3 (L2-Energy) 
3:7  7:3 (L3-Biotech) 
4:6  6:4 (L1-Energy) 
1:9  4:6 (L2-Energy) 
2:8  4:6 (L3-Biotech) 
4:6  6:4 (L1-Energy) 
4:6  7:3 (L2-Energy) 
2:8  4:6 (L3-Biotech) 
Returnee Firms ‘Local people know a lot more about the 
local policies and market environment 
than returnee entrepreneurs. Starting from 
last year, we recruited more local sales 
team to build customer relationships’. 
(President of R1-Energy) 
‘Returnees are not familiar with how to 
communicate and build relationships with 
domestic customers. We are now 
recruiting a local sales team to improve 
customer relationships’. (CEO of 
R3-Biotech) 
 ‘We want to promote communication and 
reciprocal learning through this international 
competition platform. We can build public image, 
promote collaboration in the new energy industry 
through this event’. (President of R1-Energy) 
‘We started to make our company visible to the 
publicity For example, in March, 2011 our 
returnee CEO has an interview report on Beijing 
Daily. It was a beginning of our publicity’. (CMO 
of R3-Biotech) 
‘We gradually relied more on other forms of 
collaborations other than formal R&D projects. For 
example, in our collaboration with a hospital, we 
communicated a lot and collaborated without 
contracts at the early stage because we both trust the 
principal in the project’. (VP of R2-Biotech)  
‘After years of development, we have gradually 
established our reputation and brand asset, based on 
which our collaboration with other institutes are 
more accessible and efficient’. (President of 
R1-Energy) 
Local Firms “We began to focus more on improving 
the technology of our products. We 
needed to transfer the advantage of 
marketing and profitability into R&D and 
technological capabilities.” (President of 
L1-Energy)  
“After about four years, we began to 
emphasize on the improvements of 
products and services, after we had 
accumulated some experience in the 
market.” (President of L3-Biotech) 
“As our technology developed, the impact of 
advanced technology on governmental supports 
is growing. Now I don’t need to personally 
communicate with the government officials and 
maintain the relationship very often” (President 
of L2-Energy)  
“We have just passed the authentication of the 
government that our reports of the industry is 
approved by the government. We are now one of 
the few national enterprise technology centers in 
the province.” (President of L1-Energy)  
“As the firm is having more and more R&D 
collaborations, we rely more on explicit contracts 
and rules to manage R&D collaborations. For 
example, we collaborated with a foreign institute. 
And the main mechanism we used to manage the 
collaboration is contract.” (President of L2-Energy) 
 “For the first two years, we played the edging ball 
to leverage the brand asset of the University. It was 
not formally proved the University. After the first 
two years, we were not using the University’s name 
any more. It’s better to stick to the formal 
agreement.” (President of L1-Energy) 
Note:  
1. Formal-Informal Ratio at Early Stage represents the proportion of formal vs. informal elements (sum of 10) used by each firm at the early stage. 
2. Formal-Informal Ratio at Later Stage represents the proportion of formal vs. informal elements (sum of 10) used by each firm in 2013. 
3. R3-Biotech is planning to go public. As the President told us, “we need to be more formal as we are going public”. Therefore, we treated R3-Bioteh as a special case. 
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Table	5.	Emphasis	on	synergy	between	returnee	and	local	firms	
Emphasis on Synergy Returnee Firms Local Firms 
Customer 
Relationships 
‘After several years, we have accumulated some experience in the 
local market. Then we started to make efforts to establish our brand 
and reputation because it will complement our technological 
advantages and facilitate to gain financial and human resources’. 
(President of R1-Energy) 
‘We have placed primary emphasis on technological capability 
building. However, now we need to strengthen our marketing capacity 
to sell products. We have to complement the product advantages with 
sales capacity’. (President of R3-Energy) 
 ‘It will be much easier to for our sales force to sell products if the products 
and services are improved. Ultimately, customers are paying money to 
satisfy their needs. Although it is important to use ’guanxi’ to start the 
access the customers, in the end we need to enhance the quality of our 
products and services’. (President of L3-Biotech)  
‘Ultimately we are satisfying customer’s needs. So we must improve our 
technologies and products to meet customers’ demands’. (VP of 
L1-Energy) 
Public Relationships  ‘Along time, the government had accumulated trust and familiarity 
for our firm, and believed that we have the capability to finish the 
national projects. The long-term collaborative relationship can 
complement our technological capability to enhance the government’s 
confidence about our capability’. (Administrative director of 
R2-Biotech)  
‘Although we pay more attention to building close relationships with 
government officials now, we haven’t changed much essentially. 
Although Chinese government may be influenced by personal 
relationships, eventually it needs to see your competence, especially 
for returnee firms’. (President of R1-Energy)  
‘We have always been trying to gain support from the government. At the 
first beginning, we can only try to build implicit relationship with the 
government officials. As the firm grows, we develop our technologies to 
gain formal support, which can also facilitate to obtain support from the 
publicity’. (VP of L1-Energy)  
‘A technology advantage is very important in achieving government 
support. For example, when my firm has become the standard of the 
industry, the government will actively support our development’. 
(President of L2-Energy) 
R&D Collaborative 
Relationships 
‘We have been accumulating relationships and reputation in the 
industry. Along time, we have built trust among potential 
collaborators. Therefore, we can complement detailed contracts with 
unofficial knowledge exploration to improve R&D’. (VP of 
R2-Biotech) 
‘As we have established reputation in the industry, it will be much 
easier for us to access and collaborate with other institutes. It’s like the 
Matthew Effect. Reputation will promote the R&D activities’. 
(President of R3-Biotech) 
‘First we need to rely on common goals that it is our mission to develop the 
cause of waste incineration. However, when the firm develops and deals 
with various organizations, it is not feasible to rely only on social 
sanctions. We have to rely on contracts and economic objectives. It 
becomes the cooperation between economic entities, not personal 
cooperation. Therefore, we need to use formal contracts to complement 
relationships’. (President of L2-Energy)  
‘If we can make everything clear and explicit, written down to the paper, it 
would benefit a lot in the later stage of R&D, especially in R&D alliances. 
As the firm has more partners and customers even from overseas, we need 
to establish standard R&D operations to improve internal R&D and 
collaborative R&D’. (VP of L3-Biotech) 
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Figure	1.	Data	coding	scheme	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The solid line boxes are for formal elements and the dotted line boxes are for informal elements.  
Investment in personal relationship building; 
Informal communication; 
Utilizing social networks; 
…… 
Investment in technological development;  
Lack of sales force to build customer 
relationships; 
Sales via E-Commerce without personal 
contacts; 
…… 
Customer Relationship 
Public Relationship 
Avoid publicity as much as they could; 
Passively comply with regulations and 
policies;  
Apply for support through open competition; 
…… 
Build personal relationships with officials; 
Socially interact with public stakeholders; 
Strive for implicit support through personal 
communications 
…… 
R&D Collaborative relationship 
Manage R&D collaborations based on explicit 
contracts and rules; 
Ad-hoc collaborations based on profit 
maximization; 
Firm-level strategic alliances with tight control; 
…… 
Manage R&D collaborations based on trust 
and common goals; 
Long-term collaborations based on 
relationships; 
Interpersonal scientific collaborations; 
…… 
Formality 
Universalistic depersonalized process; 
Rigidly enforced by vertical authority 
powers; 
Explicitly prescribed; 
Social and emotional detachment; 
Procedural fairness; 
……  
Informality 
Particularistic personalized process; 
Flexibly enforced by horizontal peer 
pressures; 
Implicitly assumed; 
Familiarity and affective involvement; 
Shared values and collective understandings;
……  
Open Coding 
Axial Coding 
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